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(c) The institution of a blockade without the evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly produce a demand for military protection. If this demand is to ber met, a arrison of two companies of infantry with machine guns and two sections of pack artillery is considered the minimum that could safeguard itself and also the concession.
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1
i.
7
(1) Owing to navigational difficulties, a
garrison in Shameen could quite easily be cut off and marooned.
(e) If Shameen is cut off from the outside
world. a combined naval, military and
air operation would have to be undertaken to relieve it. It is not impossible that such an operation would land us in extensive commitments.
(f) The operation described in (e) would
constitute an act of war against China.
(g) Unless His Majesty's Government is pre-
pared to face the above liabilities, the evacuation of Shameen should be a necessary preliminary to the institution of a blockade",
Our general recommendation in our last Report!
28 (1)(c) of 0.0.S.--59) was that --
"The measures to be taken for the protection of Shameen or for its evacuation, can only be decided in accordance with the situation at the moment and rust be left to the men on the spot".
para.
The present situation, as reported in the
telegrams in the Appendios,is as follows:-
The local press is working up an agitation
over the incidents at Hankow,
The
General Labour Union has held a meeting to discuss taking the Shameen concessions. The meeting was stopped by the police, but the agitation continues. The British Acting Consul General and the French Consul have warned the Cantonese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that an attempt by the mob to seize the island will be repelled by force. British Consul Gencral realises, however, that
The
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